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This paper examines the macroeconomic effects of active fiscal policy management 
coupled with a monetary policy that follows the Taylor principle. The objective is to 
investigate the relevance of the Ricardian Equivalence Proposition (REP) in a framework 
where two large open economies interact and a fraction of the consumers is financially 
constrained. According to an estimated vector autoregressive model, a positive shock in 
government expenditure leads to an increase in private consumption (at odds with the 
permanent income hypothesis). The channels are studied in a fully microfounded dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model economy calibrated for the Euro Area (EU-12) and 
for the United States. The crucial parameter that drives the break of the REP is the share of 
financially constrained consumers. Firms produce tradable varieties in a monopolistic 
competition framework and pricing is à la Calvo, which leads to nominal price stickiness. 
Labor varieties are immobile across countries and are demanded in an aggregated fashion 
by firms. Fiscal policy is specified as a time-consistent rule. We simulate through impulse-
response functions parameterizations that yield results consistent with the REP, and 
estimate a subset of deep parameters employing Bayesian techniques. 
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Este artículo examina los efectos macroeconómicos de un manejo activo de la política 
fiscal junto con una política monetaria fundada en el principio de Taylor. El objetivo es 
investigar la relevancia de la proposición de equivalencia Ricardiana (REP por sus siglas en 
inglés) en un marco donde dos economías grandes y abiertas interactúan, y donde una 
fracción de los consumidores se encuentra financieramente limitada. De acuerdo con un 
modelo de vectores autorregresivo estimado, un impulso positivo del gasto de gobierno 
conlleva un aumento en el consumo real privado (en contradicción con la hipótesis del 
ingreso permanente). Los canales son estudiados con un modelo estocástico y dinámico de 
equilibrio general microfundado, calibrado para la Unión Europea (EU-12) y para Estados 
Unidos. El resultado de la REP depende crucialmente de la participación de consumidores 
que se comportan de un modo no-Ricardiano. Las firmas producen variedades de productos 
transables internacionalmente en un mercado de competencia monopolística. La fijación de 
precios es à la Calvo, lo que implica rigidez nominal de precios. La fuerza de trabajo no 
migra y las variedades de habilidades son demandadas en forma agregada por las firmas. La 
política fiscal sigue una regla consistente en el tiempo. Se realizan funciones impulso-
respuesta con parametrizaciones del modelo que generan respuestas coherentes con la REP, 
y se estima un conjunto de parámetros estructurales empleando técnicas Bayesianas. 
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Fiscal policy (FP) management has re-emerged as an interesting theme in recent studies. As the world economy
has become increasingly interlinked due to the deepening of the integration process, natural actors to cope with or
internalize spillover eﬀects are today supranational institutions. This is specially true for European supranational
institutions which were born as a result of a broad and long-lasting political consensus.1 Under such a consensus
European Monetary Union (EMU) members formalized policy delegations with special mandate towards policy
coordination. However, looking back into the economic and political integration process, it does not display a
straight path. Often, EMU members have learned policy lessons in a rude way. Just to mention one example, the
just elected President F. Mitterrand, embarked alone on a Keynesian expansionary programme at a time of world
recession (1981) and when France’s partners were pursuing restrictive economic policies. The experiment failed, the
Franc heavily depreciated, reserves vanished and the measures had to be reverted. Implementing uncoordinated
policies became more and more costly. As similar experiences occurred in Europe, the countries eventually signed
an agreement on limiting their abilities to set independent ﬁscal policies. Hence, they built consensus on bounding
rules, such as the Maastricht Treaty which speciﬁed a limit on the budget deﬁcit to output ratio of three per cent.
This limit was complemented with a balanced-budget guideline known as Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 1997
(Breuss (2007)). As a result, these institutions served as explicit pillars for the EMU, which once settled meant a
ﬁrm background for the common currency deﬁnitively introduced in 2002.
In 2005, Italy and Germany found it hard to meet the requirements of the SGP because their economic growth
slowed down during the period 2000-2004 making diﬃcult to roll-over debt services. In order to break these tenden-
cies in the GDP growth rates, several EMU members instrumented budgetary expansions.2 At those times, several
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International
Monetary Found (IMF), the European Commission, inter allia, were concerned with tax cuts because consumers
could not consider the corresponding issuance of bonds as net wealth in their portfolios. This eﬀect is commonly
known as the Ricardian Equivalence Proposition (REP) and would imply that a today’s tax cut would not aﬀect
agents’ permanent income because they are exactly compensated by the discounted (higher) future tax liabilities
that the government would need in order to honor its outstanding debt. In other words, they feel equally rich with
and without the policy change.
Similarly, there are important implications if the REP holds in the U.S. because the huge Federal budget deﬁcit
that resulted from the ﬁscal package sent to the U.S. Congress in the beginning of 2009 will be reverted sooner or
later.
In rigor, the REP could be regarded as a direct implication of the permanent hypothesis, though it hinges on
quite strong assumptions, which are brieﬂy summarized in what follows:
1. the economic agent has a horizon that extends to the inﬁnite. Finite life durations, in addition, require: (a)
parents who care about the utility of their children in overlapping models, saving for bequest motives, see
Barro (1974); (b) an individual who faces uncertainty about how long her life will last, see Blanchard (1985);
2. there is no uncertainty of the future income streams, meaning that insurance markets exist and eﬀectively
cover bad states of nature, (see, Feldstein (1988));
3. the output –also population, in the case of pay-as-you-go social security system– does not grow enough to
enable the government to rollover the debt continuously;
4. individuals are fully rational, i.e., bounded rationality is neglected;
5. borrowing diﬀerential rates is insigniﬁcant in terms of the required information to distinguish good form bad
investment projects;
6. the new debt is allocated entirely in portfolios owned by home consumers (as long as the share of the debt
stock held by foreigners remains constant);
7. taxes are non-distortionary, i.e., the marginal tax rate does not change during the relevant horizon.
1A list of supranational European institutions includes: the European Comission, the European Parliament, the European Court of
Justice, the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors.
2In a currency area, member countries count with ﬁscal policy as a feasible policy instrument to mitigate recessions (or decelerations)
of economic activity.
2The objective of this paper is to investigate under which conditions the REP holds employing dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models and to examine the short-run interaction of two large open economies, where a
fraction of the consumers are ﬁnancially constrained (and therefore acting in a non-Ricardian way) in the framework
of a fully microfounded DSGE model. The modeling strategy followed forces the separation of consumers in two
types: (i) "unconstrained" consumers which have access to ﬁnancial markets and able to smooth consumption; and
(ii) remaining consumers face ﬁnancial constraints, who in practice have no access to borrowing/lending arrange-
ments. As a result, their ability to consume is fully determined by their disposable income (deﬁned as total taxes
subtracted from the wage income) as proposed by Campbell & Mankiw (1989). Savings, commonly deﬁned as the
residual of what is not consumed, are maintained in bonds and cash solely by unconstrained consumers.3 This
separation of consumers’ types has important consequences in open economies which so far, in our opinion, have
not been suﬃciently analyzed in the literature. This is our contribution.
Brieﬂy, the rest of the model contains ﬁrms that produce tradable varieties in a monopolistic competition
framework with nominal price stickiness. Labor’s varieties are immobile across countries and demanded by ﬁrms in
an aggregated fashion. Fiscal policy is speciﬁed as a time consistent rule.
The DSGE model is suited to deal with business cycle ﬂuctuations, but it contains parameters that must be
recovered from long run datasets. In this aspect, some hint to properly calibrate the model come from the estimation
of an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) model. We proceed to estimate a simple VAR model with classical
methods employing macroeconomic aggregate data of the EU-12 it proxies the Euro area.4 In particular, we
uncover the implied dynamic multipliers in order to calibrate key (long run) parameters of a DSGE model that
match developments resulting from a ﬁscal stimulus. The crucial parameter that drives the break of the REP is the
share of non-Ricardian consumers. We plot impulse response functions (IRFs) of key macroeconomic variables to
make clearer the point considering several shocks. Finally, we estimate a subset of parameters employing Bayesian
techniques.
The paper’s structure is as follows: in Section 2 we brieﬂy review the literature on REP; in Section 3 we present
the results of a VAR speciﬁcation for the Euro area (EU-12); in Section 4 we lay out a fully speciﬁed theoretical
model that includes internationally tradable goods and two (large) open economies presenting consumers and ﬁrms
problems and we close the model imposing equilibrium conditions; in Section 5 we present both monetary and FP
rules to which the CB and the ﬁscal authority are committed, respectively. Section 6 calibrates the theoretical
model following the literature and assuming plausible real and nominal shocks IRFs are drawn. Section 7 estimates
a subset of deep parameters of the DSGE model with Bayesian techniques. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 A brief literature review
Sargent & Wallace (1981) were among the ﬁrst to jointly address intertemporal theoretical aspects of monetary
and ﬁscal policies; however, it is often assumed in the literature that FP "adjusts" by an appropriate selection of
lump-sum transfers to neutralize the eﬀects of (non-distortionary) taxes. In particular, it is quite standard in DSGE
models to assume that FP is ﬂexible in the aforementioned way and monetary policy reacts to inﬂation and the
output gap in a way that is consistent with the so-called Taylor principle.
Leeper (1991) emphasizes that it is crucial, to distinguish between active versus passive FP. The former refers to
the case where one policy authority pursues its objective unconstrained by the other’s behavior, while the latter is
consistent with a constrained behavior. So, it is clear that to study FP impulses that are non-monetarist and non-
Ricardian in nature monetary and FP must be active. Leith & von Thadden (2006) reports that when both policies
are active, conditions that assure the existence of a unique equilibrium sequence (i.e., its solution is determinate in
the sense of Blanchard & Kahn (1980)) become stricter. Intuitively, this is because the solution must be compatible
with non-explosive sequences for both the price level and the public debt.
The early empirical literature seems to be inconclusive in favor of the validity of the REP. Becker (1995), Seater
(1993), Bernheim (1988) surveyed the evidence from aggregate data samples and came up with contradictory
conclusions. Further evidence that appeared in the 1990s employing VARs have reached a sort of consensus, giving
support to basically three main ﬁndings: (i) disregarding the particular identiﬁcation strategy utilized, there is
no study suggesting that consumption responds negatively to an expansionary budgetary policy (a prediction that
would be against the permanent income hypothesis); (ii) the real wage responds positively when a government
3We acknowledge, however, that to some extent the presence of the so-called rule-of-thumb consumers are merely a shortcut that
may disregard other interesting avenues of research (e.g. learning). The advantage is that it allow us to keep our model within a medium
scale meanwhile it leads to valuable output in order to derive policy recommendations.
4The EU-12 aggregate comprises the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain and The Netherlands. The data employed is detailed in the Data Appendix.
3impulse takes place; and (iii) that ﬁscal spillovers to neighbor countries occur via trade, a phenomenon not found in
the former literature. The idea is that a ﬁscal expansion stimulates home output because of the shift of aggregate
demand, leading to more domestic imports (and thus more exports and output of foreign countries). This evidence
points to spillover eﬀects solely since government imports seem to be insigniﬁcant, Giuliodori & Beetsma (2005),
Fatas & Mihov (2001a), Fatas & Mihov (2001b), inter allia.
In contrast, studies that test the REP/permanent income hypothesis using samples with individual/household
data, seem to oﬀer support to the REP, e.g., De Juan & Seater (1999), Campbell & Cocco (2007), inter allia.
Which modiﬁcation for the DSGE model would be necessary to reproduce the VAR evidence? It is now quite
known that a RBC model predicts a fall in consumption and in real wages as a result of a FP expansion (Baxter
& Crucini (1993)). Linnemann & Schabert (2003) add nominal rigidities in an otherwise standard RBC model and
report that a positive ﬁscal impulse yieds a drop in consumption and an increase in real wages. In view of this
result, recently the standard NK DSGE model with separable utility was extended with consumer heterogeneity:
some of them are fully rational and optimizers, whereas others are ﬁnancially constrained and decide consumption
with a pattern characterized as hand-to-mouth consumption. In particular, Mankiw (2000) assumes that the latter
type of agents behave in a myopic way because they do not have access to ﬁnancial markets to smooth consumption.
Thereby, their consumption depends on disposable income rather than on permanent income. The main reference
we follow in this paper is Galí et al. (2007b). While these authors focus on a closed economy, we extend their
framework to two (large) open economies, that we further take to EU-12 and U.S. data. This extension is promising
since it will allow us to characterize the international spillover eﬀect as well as relative price ﬂuctuations that would
explain the pattern of spillovers, which is a novelty in the literature. Galí et al. (2007b)’s model predicts that if rule
of thumb agents are relatively many w.r.t. the total, aggregate consumption responds positively to the government
impulse (because the eﬀect is dominated by constrained consumers).
A second strand of the real business cycle (RBC) literature assumes homogeneity of consumers but these present
non-separable preferences. This literature employs preferences of the types KPR King et al. (1988) and GHH
Greenwood et al. (1988). Linnemann (2006) presents a model where consumption increases after a shock to
government. The model has ﬂexible prices and assumes that hours and consumption are complements. Other
results of the model, though logically consistent seem to be counterintuitive because the utility function considers
consumption as an inferior good along with a downward sloping labor supply. In contrast, Monacelli & Perotti
(2008) compare KPR and GHH preferences and conclude that in both consumption is a normal good, thereby a
shock in government expenditure increase consumption only if real wages and hours go up.
Recent evidence for the U.S. employing a DSGE model suggests that ﬁscal multipliers are small in normal times
but sharply increase when the interest rate hits the zero lower bound, Christiano et al. (2009). The reason for this
is that an increase in government spending lowers desired national savings and breaks the eﬀects of Keynes (1936)’s
paradox of thrift (a mechanism by which Keynes explains why depressions exacerbates). It is beyond the scope
of this paper to appropriately treat the zero lower bound and its eﬀects on ﬁscal multipliers; instead, we focus on
normal times (as Cogan et al. (2009) do).
3 Assessing the eﬀects of an expansionary FP in the closed economy
In this section we focus on the eﬀects on consumption resulting from an expansionary FP, particularly on ﬁscal
multipliers. The main hypothesis is that the essential macroeconomic variables can be represented by a VAR model
(this method is valid if we take for granted assumptions set by Hamilton (1994), p. 261).
In a recent paper, Galí et al. (2007b) present evidence for the U.S., suggesting that expansionary FP, say an
increase of public expenditures, leads to an expansion of private consumption of nondurable goods. As we referred
in the introductory section, practically all studies so far have found a positive consumption dynamic multiplier of
the FP on impact and also at diﬀe r e n t( f u t u r e )t i m eh o r i z o n s .H i n g i n go n these results, we estimate a VAR using
key aggregate macroeconomic series for the EU-12 aggregate. The estimation exercise is constrained to consider a
very parsimonious VAR model that is ﬁt with data from 1991Q1 to 2006Q4.5 The estimation follows closely Galí
et al. (2007b), to make our results fully comparable with evidence from what they call “small” VAR model, which
is just a stylized closed-economy model for the U.S.
5Notice that to be fully comparable with the model developed in Section 4 the model has to add foreign economy variables for the
rest of the world. However, technical limitations prevent us to conduct such an application. There are aggregation concerns for data
on the EU-12 entity such as the uniﬁcation process that took place in Germany in 1991, the implementation of the ECU (a basket of
currencies of the European Community member states during the convergence process to adopt the Euro, inter allia.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
adding more than four variables in the VAR becomes a risky enterprise for identiﬁcation.
4We consider the following VAR (4) speciﬁcation:6
y = Γ0 + Γ1y−1 + Γ2y−2 + Γ3y−3 + Γ4y−4 +  (1)
where y ≡ (   )
0 and  are 4 × 1 vectors. The former includes the following endogenous variables:
government expenditure, GDP, private consumption and primary deﬁcit, while  is a disturbance vector with mean
the null vector and variance-covariance matrix Σ. The ordering of y reﬂects that government spending is assumed
predetermined relative to the other variables included in the VAR since we assume shocks’ identiﬁcation employ a
Cholesky decomposition.
In the framework of diﬀerence equations, a dynamic multiplier of (1) for one-quarter-ahead eﬀect of variable 










As in Galí et al. (2007b), we consider EU-12 aggregates of general government spending (general government
spending net of military expenditures), gross domestic product, private consumption and general government budget
deﬁcit. Table 1 summarizes our ﬁndings for EU-12 aggregates which are in accordance with those reported by Galí
et al. (2007b). The dynamic multipliers of consumption and GDP are positive when expansionary FP takes place
within a two years horizon. This evidence suggests that consumers in the Euro area react to increases in public
expenditure increasing their consumption as well, response that is at odds with the well known REP and the
neoclassical model. If the latter model would apply, consumers would have behaved diﬀerently, taking for granted
that future tax slips will increase to cover the current budgetary deﬁcit (that equals the amount in bonds that the
government needs to sell today).
Our results are also comparable with other studies. Perotti (2005) focuses on the evidence of ﬁve OECD countries
including the U.S. He ﬁnds that expansionary FP triggers GDP increases that are smaller than 1-to-1, except for
the U.S. in the pre-1980 period. The ﬁscal multipliers have become substantially weaker over time. Moreover,
Blanchard & Perotti (2002) ﬁnds that multipliers are smaller in Europe compared to the U.S. A recent survey on
ﬁscal multipliers is Spilimbergo et al. (2009). There is a diﬀerence in the sense that we ﬁnd FP multipliers that have
hump-shaped form, that contrast with the monotonically decreasing multipliers reported by Galí et al. (2007b).
Table 1. Fiscal multipliers of public expenditure in the EMU
Private Consumption GDP
Quarter Full government Government spending Full government Government spending
spending excluding military spending excluding military
1st 0.061 (0.04) 0.059 (-0.11) 0.047 (0.51) 0.044 (0.15)
2nd 0.148 0.143 0.139 0.132
3rd 0.177 0.168 0.206 0.196
4th 0.252 (0.09) 0.237 (0.24) 0.274 (0.31) 0.261 (-0.12)
5th 0.299 0.280 0.344 0.329
6th 0.278 0.255 0.374 0.359
7th 0.249 0.221 0.413 0.398
8th 0.198 (0.19) 0.166 (0.32) 0.434 (0.28) 0.417 (0.34)
Note: Authors’ calculations for the EU-12 aggregates in a closed economy model. Comparable FP
multipliers for the U.S. in a similar model are estimated by Galí et al. (2007a)
on Table 1, p. 233, which are reported in brackets to compare them.
4T h e m o d e l
To begin with, we assume that there are two regions in the world economy. Each region of the world economy
is populated by a continuum of economic agents “consumers” that live inﬁnitely and that are normalized to one.
Home consumer  is indexed by  ∈ [01].7 Likewise, foreign consumers are denoted by ∗ a n di n d e x e db y∗ ∈ [01].
Moreover, each region has an administrative authority –the national government–, which levies taxes and issues
bonds with which it can purchase goods (or transfer money).
6Alternative estimates with diﬀerent lags lengths provided us with the information to determine that an adequate  is 4 quarters.
Relevant information criteria considered were Akaike information criterion and Schwarz criterion.
7We can think about dynasties of individuals that continue living through their children owing to intergenerational solidarity, to
relax the problem of choosing a discrete living period. Alternatively, we may consider adding a probability of death of the representative
individual, as Blanchard (1985).
5There are two types of rational consumers in both economies: (i) ﬁnancially constrained consumers (myopic
though fully rational) and (ii) those that can access ﬁnancial markets. Since we focus on the short run, we assume
that these types contain a ﬁxed number of agents (leading to constant shares), i.e., those constrained agents do not
learn how to overcome the constraint.
4.1 Consumers’ intratemporal problem
All goods varieties (home and foreign produced) are tradable, have world markets and are indexed with  and 
indices that belong to the [01].8 Agent ’s consumption is devoted to purchase home and foreign goods. Prices
are denominated in home currency; thus, if the law of one price (LOOP) holds, then ()=E∗
() and
foreign goods prices are converted by the nominal exchange rate E.9 We assume that the representative agent takes














Individual aggregate consumption is represented by the index 

,w h i c hi ss p e c i ﬁed as a Constant Elasticity of


























where  stands for the share in the consumption of home goods in terms of the total tradable goods, .T h e
counterpart (1 − ) refers to the share of foreign produced goods, , in terms of .10
Notice that aggregate consumption (4) involves the consumption indices of home and foreign produced varieties.
In particular, we assume that these indices are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators of all consumed varieties with elasticity of






























The intratemporal problem solved by agent  is to minimize 






































. Notice that prices are denominated in home currency
(again if the LOOP holds, then  = E∗















 obtained above, optimal demand functions of both home and imported varieties can be analogously derived.
8A more general model would deﬁne an additional index for varieties such that  ∈ [0) along with  ∈ [1]. For simplicity, we
assume that the ‘segment’ of varieties is equal to population shares of the two countries, which does not imply loss of generality (it is
just a normalization applied to a continuous variable’s range).
9E is deﬁned as the price of a unit of foreign currency in terms of the home currency. Notice that this deﬁnition is the inverse of
the ﬁnancial nominal exchange rate.









6Intratemporal problems involve the minimization of the expenditure spent on: (i) home varieties, 

, subject
to Equation (5) by choosing 

();and (ii) foreign varieties 

 subject to Equation (13) choosing 

().





















where again under LOOP ()=E∗
(). The associated home and imported tradable goods price indices
















These prices (identiﬁed at the optimum with Lagrange multipliers) can be interpreted as minimum prices to buy





Following Benigno (2004), the government sector also demands home tradable varieties, ().W e a s s u m e








where aggregated government purchases, ,i sd e ﬁned similarly as Equation (5), with a relationship between
 and  given by an equation similar to Equation (7), though the government home bias parameter, ,i s
assumed to be one. This is justiﬁed since as we mentioned in Section 2, the government expenditure on imported
goods seems to have a small impact on the foreign economy, see Giuliodori & Beetsma (2005).  is taken as
exogenous.11
For the foreign economy, a similar set of demands holds both for the representative consumer ∗ and for the
foreign government.
4.2 Consumer’s intertemporal problem
4.2.1 Unconstrained consumers


























which depends on aggregate (current and lagged) consumption, 
, real money balances,


 ,a n dw o r ke ﬀort
in terms of hours worked in the home tradable good sector, 

. Lagged consumption is the simplest way to
introduce internal habit formation in consumption.12 In addition, liquidity services provided by real balances of
money generate utility (). What is more, disutility  (·) is derived from work eﬀort –in terms of worked hours,


– devoted in the production of  goods.13 Finally,  is a disturbance that is  with mean one and standard
error .
11The parliament and the administration get to a consensus based on political motives about its level.
12The introduction of internal habit formation rather than external habit formation is motivated by the study of Grishchenko (2007).
Using long-horizon aggregate stock market returns, she found that there is strong support for internal habit formation preferences,
which decays slowly over time. In addition, this feature adds realism to the model’s predictions (IRFs) and help explaining asset pricing
puzzles. In particular, IRFs are much alike than those obtained with an unrestricted VAR. See Fuhrer (2000).
13 ˘ 

 is a real-valued function, additive and separable. We assume that its components, (·) (·) and  (·), are all increasing in their





















7It is rational for the agent to maximize its expected future utility (15) conditional upon the information available















































In the LHS of the budget constraint the sources of agent’s real income can be found: net of tax wage income from
work supplied to the home tradable goods sector, 










expected real returns on home-issued bonds holdings and real transfers from the government. Furthermore, the
uses of resources are in the RHS: consumption, variation in the stock of money holdings in real terms and variation
in the stock of riskless home and foreign bonds (without any subscript).
Following Woodford (2003), we assume that home asset (securities) markets are complete, thus we treat diﬀerent
assets comprising the portfolio as one, see Plasmans et al. (2007). 
 denotes the portfolio’s value at the beginning
of the period, which includes bonds and shares. This greatly simpliﬁes the algebra and it is supported by the known
envelope theorem that assures that all investment alternatives should produce the same real return at the optimum.

 is like a world-traded bond and it is denominated in issuer’s currency, in which worldwide agents take positions
to ﬁnance domestic consumption (indirectly trade deﬁcits). The riskless (non-contingent) nominal return is denoted
by  with one-period-maturity. Notice that  is a shock that is  with mean one and standard error 
that accounts for a shock in the UIP condition.




 and money. The government




equalized money supply which is under control of the CB, though indirectly, since the operating instrument is the
nominal interest rate.









−1 =0  (17)
To inquire about the implications of Equation (17), ﬁrst, let us deﬁne the stock of wealth at time  in terms of















 for foreign. Note that those
assets are maintained in the portfolio for diﬀerent reasons; while money facilitates transactions, bonds are used to
store value and are issued to ﬁnance foreign current account deﬁcits.16 Initially, we can easily check that the wealth
is identical across members of the diﬀerent regions.17 Moreover, recalling that asset markets are complete within
the regions, thus we can predict perfect risk sharing in consumption. Consequently, we state that the problem of
the agent is fully described maximizing the utility, Equation (15) subject to the budget constraint (16), given the
initial conditions (17), the sequences of prices and incomes and the transversality condition. See Section 4.5.






































where 0 is a parameter that measures agent’s disposition to take risks –the greater when the agent is more
risk averse– and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, while the parameter
 ∈ [01] stands for the persistence in consumption or internal habit formation. As was deﬁned above,  stands for
a shock to preferences which speciﬁcally aﬀects consumption decisions. Moreover,  and  are scale parameters.
Finally,  is the elasticity of demand of money and  is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution in exert work
eﬀort respect to real wage.












15If home country has a positive stock of debt, it must add to the riskless interest rate a premium, which is a non-decreasing function
of debt position; see Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2001).
16Shares also are used to store value; however, it likely delivers more volatility and capital gains could be non-positive. These aspects
lead us to consider risk aversion of agents as crucial.
17To conﬁrm that, plug Eq. (17) into W and W.
8The resulting optimality conditions of the consumer problem are suﬃcient when budget constraint (16) is
exhausted and the solution is "interior".18 First, representative home agents would like to smooth consumption
along time as much as they can, thus initially at time , for every positive time interval  − , consumers equalize































































They decide consumption within-period such that marginal utility of real consumption equals the marginal


















































as real money balances increases utility; however, given the nominal interest rate , having money in pockets imply
an opportunity cost represented by the “expected” real interest rate of bonds forgone.
Third, given information up to time  the home optimality conditions w.r.t. 
 allow us to price the interna-




















































Optimum domestic holding of foreign bonds is:
Λ





























































. The other FOCs remain the same.
19If consumption were speciﬁed to be state dependent, () consumers would equalize the marginal rate of substitution between









Moreover, the budget constraint is binding at any time and for all histories . Ascari (2004) suggests that models were the duration
of the relevant contracts is state-dependent may characterize more accurately observed data developments. At least for the Belgium
economy; however, Aucremanne & Dhyne (2005) ﬁnd that state-dependent contracts seems to be empirically irrelevant for explaining
price rigidities.












where  depends on initial conditions.20 We follow the literature and assume that  =1 , meaning that the initial
indebtness is zero and also that consumers have similar consumption bundles.
4.2.2 Constrained consumers
Regarding the share of the households that are ﬁnancially constrained,  ∈ (01), it is important to notice that
they consume as much as they get in their disposable income. A representative consumer of this type, , behaves
as a rule-of-thumb consumer, i.e., optimizing intratemporally, but he does not so intertemporally. Technically, it
means that the Lagrangean for the consumer can be broken down for each period, where utility function as Equation
(18) is maximized.
An expansionary FP will shift aggregate demand and output, as disposable income rises rule-of-thumb consumers
will consume more, disregarding any future tax liability. If and only if the higher consumption of rule-of-thumb
consumers oﬀset the downward shift of optimizers’ consumption, then aggregate consumption will go up. As a
result, we would be able to replicate with our model the evidence reported in Section 3. In the following section we
explore the aggregation.
Following Coenen & Straub (2005), Di Bartolomeo & Manzo (2007), Di Bartolomeo et al. (2007), Galí et al.
(2007b), the binding budget constraint of the representative rule-of-thumb consumer, (we omit it to simplify








where, a simple comparison with Equation (16) reveals that these consumers do not save: (i) there are no dividends
proceeds; and (ii) they are not able smooth consumption by keeping money or bonds. As in the case of optimizing
households, hours 
 are determined by ﬁrms’ labor demand and are not chosen optimally by each household
given the wage (see Section 4.4). Finally, 
 are transfers (if 
  0) or taxes paid in a lump-sum fashion
(if 
  0).
4.2.3 Aggregation of consumers’ choice variables
As we stated in the previous section, the economy embrace both types of consumers: optimizers and rule-of-thumb.
The share of the formers in the total consumers is 1 − . Therefore, aggregated consumption, 

 , is obtained
as the weighted average of the respective aggregated consumptions:











Likewise, for the number of hours worked,













Notice that we assume that each ﬁrm decides how much labor to hire (given the wage, see Section 4.4), and allocates
its labor demand uniformly across households (the type does not signal any diﬀerence in the marginal productivity
of labor). As a result, 
 = 







4.3 Producers and importers
Home tradable goods are produced by a large amount of ﬁrms in the home economy. Part of this production is
sold at the home market and the remaining abroad as exports. Suppose that there is a continuum of independent
(producers) ﬁrms indexed in the (01) interval, each of them enjoying monopolistic power on varieties produced. In
addition, there are a continuum of importers, also indexed in the (01) interval. A common characteristic is that
producers and importers enjoy monopolistic power, being able to set prices that maximize their proﬁts.
20Speciﬁcally,  = E0∗
0 00∗
∗0.
104.3.1 Technology and marginal costs
Final goods producers at home are indexed by  ∈ (01) and have access to the following technology:21
 ()= () ()
 − () (32)
where  stands for the mean (constant) productivity,  () is the number of hours hired () is a (constant)
ﬁxed cost of managing the ﬁrm and  () denotes an exogenous technological process:
 ()=−1 ()+ (33)
where  ∈ (01) measures the persistency and  is an  disturbance with mean zero and constant variance
2
.
We assume that import ﬁrms simply repackage and give a domestic brand to otherwise standardized goods,
which they ﬁnally sell in the domestic market.
The ﬁrm’s problem is to minimize the total cost which is given by the wage bill,  (), subject to (32).
The optimal labor demand is obtained by inversion of (32):
 ()=
∙
























similarly for the foreign ﬁrm we obtain (∗),  and .
T h ed o m e s t i c( f o r e i g n )ﬁrm faces wages set by unions, H
(), where there are a continuum of competitive
unions H(F) ∈ [01].T h e ﬁrm  chooses the speciﬁc labor varieties so that it minimizes the cost H
H
()


































The foreign ﬁrm ∗ solves a similar problem with relevant elasticity given by ∗
.
4.3.2 Pricing
In the empirical literature, e.g., Aucremanne & Dhyne (2005), price movements reveal diﬀerent degrees of stickiness.
In particular, for those varieties that are eﬀectively traded, either exported or imported, one key determinant of the
price (besides the marginal cost) is the nominal exchange rate, which easily propagates with imperfect pass-through.
Stickiness may the result of multiple causes; however, the implied eﬀect is that propagation takes place imperfectly
to both real and nominal variables.
We model price stickiness following Calvo (1983), who assume that domestic ﬁrms adjust their price infrequently
and in such an event, they reset prices according to ’price signals’, which follow an exogenous  Poisson process






11with constant probability. Hence, ﬁrms set prices in staggered ’contracts’ of random duration. For instance, this
probability in the home tradable goods market is 1 − 
()
 , meaning that ﬁrm  would be able to announce a new
price with probability 1−
()
 ; otherwise, the old price, remains in eﬀect (e.g., instrumented in a contract). Hence,
this ﬁrm  will not be able to adjust its price on its market with probability 
()
 . This probability is the so-called
Calvo price parameter.23
To analyze the maximization problem of the producer, notice that the law of large numbers can be applied since
the number of ﬁrms is large, so that we drop the Calvo price parameter’s upper index .I fﬁrm  of type  = {
} gets to announce a new contract in period ,a tt h a tt i m ei tc h o o s e sap r i c et om a x i m i z et h ev a l u eo fi t s

















subject to relevant demand functions.25 In Equation (39), the (nominal) discount factor from  to  + , applied
by ﬁrm  to the stream of future proﬁts, results from (22) for home assets as ∆















the household ’s marginal utility of nominal wealth, which indeed does
not diﬀer across agents because of complete assets markets (Λ

 = Λ). In addition, P() is the appropriate vector
of relevant prices of home produced goods in sector  and  +()(·) is the (nominal) total cost of production
at period + of ﬁrm  of domestic type , which is a function of ﬁrm ’s total output during period .M o r e o v e r ,
 is the unity vector consisting of an appropriate number of ones which equals the number of markets and (m)
is the vector of Calvo probabilities for price vector ˘ P() remaining unchanged for producer  of domestic type
. Entries of this vector correspond to elements of relevant prices ˘ () and ˘ () and  ≡ [ ]0.
Solving Equation (39) subject to relevant demands, we obtain the following optimality condition (see Plasmans
et al. (2007), Subsection 8.1.1 and Appendix I):
˘ P()=
⎡





























⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
 (40)
where ﬁrm ’s prices ˘ P() of domestic type  are aggregated over consumers as it is done for wages in Plasmans
et al. (2007), Equation (102) in Appendix B.2, resulting in vectors ˘ P().26
Since any domestic price at period , (), is assumed to be a CES aggregator of the predetermined price
{−1()} and the newly set price ˘ () according to Calvo in (40), this domestic price index for a typical
domestic company  of type  can be written as:
(())
1− =  (−1())





where the -subscript stands for  and . It can be shown that three diﬀerent Phillip curves can be derived if
Equation (40) is rewritten in terms of appropriate inﬂation rates.27






periods, since 0 
()
  1. For example, a Calvo price parameter equal to 0.75 implies an average duration of 4 periods.
As 
()
 → 0, ﬁrm  in the ﬁnal goods sector sets its prices each period, which is the ﬂexible price case.
24Notice that prices quoted by consumption importers are invoiced in the domestic currency and exporters in the foreign currency.







taking equilibrium conditions into account, + = + + +.
26Notice that as  → 0,t h er e l e v a n tﬁrms reset their prices each period (the ﬂexible price case) and a particular ﬁrm  of type  sets
its price as a (monopolistic) markup over its marginal cost, i.e. then ˘ () → 
(−1)() with () ≡  (())
27By exploiting the recursive form of the inﬁnite summations and log-linearizing w.r.t. the steady state values.
124.4 Staggered wage setting
Labor is immobile across countries. Each country’s labor market presents monopolistic competition where ﬁrms
are wage takers.28 It is assumed that labor suppliers have learned that they posses special abilities that can be
imperfectly substituted by ﬁrms which is delegated to wage unions. Regardless the consumer type, constrained or
unconstrained, the centralization by union makes labor eﬀorts equal in equilibrium. This is an artiﬁce that allows
us to treat the wage setting problem aside from the consumer problem.29 The same strategy is considered in Galí
et al. (2007b), Furlanetto (2007), Forni et al. (2007), Coenen & Straub (2005), among others.
Following Calvo (1983), there is a known probability that gives unions the opportunity to reset home and
foreign wages, (1 − ) and (1 − ∗
), respectively.30 Each draw of the ‘signal’ is exogenous and independent of
past realizations and assumed to follow a Bernoulli distribution. Unions that are not signaled, a share  of them,
keep the nominal wage at the level observed in the previous period. In the event that the union is signaled, it will







































Since all signaled agents set the same wage ˘ H = ˘ , the aggregate wage of the home economy explained by














 () ∀ (44)
Regarding the bonds issued by the government, those denominated in home currency are used to ﬁnance public
expenditures, while those denominated in foreign currency is the counterpart amount of the accumulated previous
net trade balances,
P
=0 −,w h e r e is deﬁned as exports minus imports at period .
We can state the bond equilibrium condition as follows:



















































28Alternatively, if labor were homogeneous, the supply of working hours in the home economy would be coming from a consumers ’s
FOC: (

()) = Λ,w h e r e

() denote hours supplied of the individual  to home representative ﬁrm  ∈ [01] and the
clearing-market nominal wage is .
29In a setup where all consumer are unconstrained, the wage contract is set so that it maximizes the expected discounted sum of
agent ’s utility ﬂows, while supplying all the labor requested. For instance, under Calvo wage schedule, we refer to Equation (80) in
Subsection 8.2.2 and Appendix K in Plasmans et al. (2007).
30In applying Calvo wage setting, we follow Coenen & Straub (2005). Furlanetto (2007) shows that similar results can be obtained
employing quadratic adjustment costs. Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2006) show that, up to second order approximation, there are negligible
diﬀerences between the Erceg et al. (2000) model, i.e., where each household is the monopolistic supplier of a diﬀerentiated type of
labor input and the one in which households supply a homogenous labor input that is transformed by monopolistically competitive
labor unions into a diﬀerentiated labor input (Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2005)).
135 Fiscal and Monetary policy
So far the model is a simpliﬁed version of Plasmans et al. (2007) extended with the two types of consumers and
with active FP. In this section, we comment on the assumed ﬁscal and monetary policies followed by the home
country. Similarly, the foreign economy is subject to same restrictions and rules.
5.1 Fiscal policy
In this section, we present a simpliﬁed structure of the government of the home economy. The government levies
taxes from dividends, , and from the wage bill, . However, it is not bounded by genuine resources: it can issue
bonds and sell them to the agents and provide money for transactions. In any period , the outstanding bonds stock
or/and money increase (decrease) if expenditures are higher than tax proceeds. Expenditures of the government






















































 +  (48)
Equation (48) includes on the left hand side labor revenues, money creation and net domestic and foreign bor-
rowing, while on the right hand side outlays of government revenues (transfers and goods purchases) are considered.
In particular, we assume that the government do not disfavor any type of consumers, so we assume the transfers





⇒  = 
 (by aggregation, see Equation (30)).
Abstracting from diﬀerent government levels, we assume that lump-sum transfers (taxes are negative) are set
according to the following rule:





w h e r et r a n s f e r sa r et i e dt or e a ld o m e s t i cp u b l i ce x p e n d i t u re and (possibly) also to domestic output volumes when
2 6=0 . Besides,  stands for an exogenous shock to transfers that is  with mean zero and standard error
2
. Of course, this is an arbitrarily simple manner to endogenize transfers. We assume 1  0, which intuitively
means that transfers are positively correlated with public purchases. Likewise, a similar explanation justiﬁes that
2  0.





that accounts for deviations of the real expenditure from its steady state, normalized by the steady state real GDP.
It evolves according to the following AR(1) process:
 = −1 +  (50)
where 0    1 and  represents an  shock with mean zero and constant variance 2
. 31
5.2 Monetary policy
Designing monetary policy rules concerns the choice of (a) the monetary policy instruments, (b) the variables to
be targeted and (c) their targeted values. In theory, a Central Bank (CB) can deﬁne diﬀerent monetary policy
instruments to be targeted as, e.g., (i) interest rate targeting, (ii) exchange rate targeting and (iii) money supply
targeting. In the literature, variables that are often targeted are: (1) real output (gap), (2) (changes in) prices, (3)
(changes in) exchange rates, (4) (changes in) interest rates, (5) a combination of real output and prices in the form
of nominal GDP.
Kydland & Prescott (1977) claim that monetary policy eﬀectiveness depends, not only on policy actions under-
taken, but also on the public perception about these actions and its expectations about future actions. Consequently,
policy is more eﬀective when future actions are predictable, so that a monetary authority can commit itself to a
certain course of policies. As Atoian et al. (2004) argue, commitment permits the CB to distribute ’policy medi-
cine’ over time. For example, when the CB wishes to oﬀset inﬂation that will result from a supply shock, under
commitment, it can raise interest rates moderately provided that it maintains higher rates for a period of time. In
contrast, in the case of lack of commitment, a higher initial rate increase will be necessary because of the public
doubts that the CB will sustain this interest rate increase.
31Alternatively, an endogenous expenditure rule could be considered, for instance, one that includes cyclical GDP in Equation (50) .
14Atoian et al. (2004) also argue that optimal commitment does not need to take the form of a reaction function
with ﬁxed coeﬃcients. In general, an optimal commitment rule has the form of a state-contingent plan that
presents the instrument setting as a function of the history of exogenous shocks. However, optimal commitment
is not practical because, ﬁrst, as noted by Woodford (2003), it is not feasible to provide an advance listing of all
relevant contingencies and, second, it is diﬃcult for the public to distinguish between discretion and a complicated
contingency rule. Both problems are avoided when the CB commits to a rule with ﬁxed coeﬃcients.
Which form should such a rule with ﬁxed coeﬃcients take? Since most CBs use a short-term interest rate as
their control variable, we are focusing on rules that relate this short-term interest rate to economic conditions. The
most famous and widely used examples of simple (short-term) interest rate rules are those proposed by John Taylor.
The standard Taylor rule (see Taylor (1993b)), which relates the interest rate target to inﬂation and output
(gap) in a log-linearized form, is:
+1 = 0 + 1
(4)





=0− and  are annualized domestic inﬂation and (logarithmic) deviations of domestic output
w.r.t. their respective steady state values, which are assumed to be the target variables of the home monetary





. Taylor (1993a) assigns coeﬃcient values consistent with
an accurate description of Federal Reserve policy for quarterly data and domestic annualized inﬂation: 1 =1 5
and 2 =0 54=0 15. The intuition for the value of the former reaction parameter is that the CB must raise
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t eb ym o r et h a na n yi n c r e a s ei ni n ﬂation in order to raise the real rate of interest, cool the economy
and move inﬂation back toward its target. This refers to the so-called “lean against the wind” policy advocated by
Taylor.
Moreover, Taylor (1999) suggests an alternative that allows for interest-rate smoothing:






+ 3−1 +  (52)
w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a tt h es m o o t h i n gp r o c e d u r ef o l l o w sa n(1) process with smoothing parameter 3 and what
is inside the braces is the CB’s desired interest rate that comes from the standard rule (51).32
McCallum (1997) argues that the policymakers’ reaction is more accurate if it is based on lagged and not on
current values of output and inﬂation. In response, Taylor (1999) suggests an alternative form of his rules where
lagged values of output and inﬂation replace the current values in (51). In contrast, Clarida et al. (2000), inter
allia, argue that rules in which the CB reacts to forward-looking variables are optimal in the case of a quadratic
objective function of the monetary authorities, which will also be utilized in this paper. The diﬀerence between
backward-looking, contemporaneous and forward-looking monetary rules relates primarily to the information set
of the monetary policymakers. For instance, in the case of a contemporaneous rule, the current inﬂation rate, on
which the CB is assumed to have adequate information, is targeted.
5.3 Shocks driving the economy
We consider several shocks, all of them characterized as exogenous processes. They have similar structure as
Equation (50) and their introduction in the model is motivated because they are useful to drive the set of endogenous
variables of the economy. We take into account the following shocks:
1. UIP shock, , interpreted as shift in the foreign asset’s return;
2. domestic (foreign) productivity shocks, (∗
), understood as a shift in the production function;
3. domestic (foreign) MP rule shock, (∗
);
4. domestic (foreign) transfers shock, (∗
), interpreted as an increase of transfers to the public;
5. domestic (foreign) expansionary budgetary policy shock, (∗
);
6. domestic (foreign) preference shock, (∗
), interpreted as a upward shift of full the preference map.
32We calibrated 3 =0 75 throughout all exercises. This assumption allows us to interpret that the CB’s interest rate that actually
prevails now will have no-eﬀect in the 4-quarters ahead interest rate.
15These shocks are considered as unexpected by the agents. Moreover, in general, they have AR(1) structures
that turn simple the modeling of the degree of persistency. For example, whilst a permanent shock is consistent
with a -parameter equal to one, a purely temporary shock is with  =0 .










where v are innovations, i.e.,  with mean zero vector and diagonal variance-covariance matrix Σv.F o r m a l l y ,











),a n dv ≡ (, , ∗
, , ∗
, ,  ∗, , ∗
, , ∗
)0.
6 Calibration and simulation methodology
A RE equilibrium is then a set of processes of the endogenous variables that satisfy both ﬁrst order conditions
(from corresponding optimal problems) and equilibrium conditions at all dates  ≥ 0 given the exogenous processes
included in the vector +.
The non linear DSGE model containing both economies can be speciﬁed as an implicit multivariate function as
the most compact manner:
 [(y+1yy−1v)] = 0 (54)
where y ∈ Λ ⊆ R is the set of endogenous variables, while v are structural innovations deﬁned above. The
function  : Λ3 × R11 −→ Λ is real in C2 parameterized by the real vector  ∈ Θ ⊆ R where  is the dimension
of the parameter space that include deep parameters.
Assuming the existence of a non linear stochastic diﬀerence equation (unique, stable and invariant) of the form:
y = H(y−1v) (55)
that solves (54) where H is a collection of policy and transition functions. Repeated substitution of Equation (55)
into (54) provides a system where y and v are included in the information set at time .G i v e nt h a tw ek n o wt h e
exact form (our hypothesized model) of , our unknown is H.
The model (54) has a solution at a ﬁxed point that is known as the deterministic ( [v]=0) steady state.
Formally,
(y∗()y∗()y∗()0)=0 (56)
where y∗()=H(y∗()0). The steady state is a crucial element to solve our model given the fact that we use local
approximation methods. That means that Jacobians and Hessians, etc. that arise because of the Taylor expansion
of (54) are evaluated at y∗().
The model is log-linearized around the steady state (ﬁrst order approximation, i.e., ˆ y ≡ y − y∗())a n d
reshuﬄed in a linear state space system as suggested by Sims (2002) using a guess policy function:
B1ˆ y + B2ˆ y−1 + Cv + D = 0 (57)
since we solve (57) with his RE algorithm. It is primarily based on the systematic perturbation of the policy function
around the steady state. Note that  contains expectational errors (so that we drop the expectation operator).
Second, Equation (57) is rewritten after applying the QZ factorization as:33
Q0ΛZ
0ˆ y + Q0ΩZ
0ˆ y−1 + Cv + D = 0
Third, generalized eigenvalues of B1 and B2 are reorganized in Λ and Ω in increasing order from the left to the
right (Q0 and Z0 are reorganized accordingly). Redeﬁning transformed variables as ˘ y ≡ Z0ˆ y and premultiplying
the system by Q results in the following upper triangular system:
Λ˘ y + Ω˘ y−1 + QCv + QD = 0
where ˘ y ≡ (˘ y1˘ y2)
0(similarly for other matrices), with the block Λ12 has been zeroed out (corresponding to
forward-looking variables ˘ y2). We refer to Sims (2002) for the details in solving the following step, the fourth,
where ˘ y2 is solved iterating forwardly, and then (once ˘ y2 is known) ˘ y1 is solved iterating backwardly. The
33Matrices Q0 and Z0 are unitary matrices (with R or C numbers), while Ω and Λ are upper triangular.
16critical issue arises in solving ˘ y1 because it involves expectational errors QD and exogenous shocks errors QCv.
Uniqueness of the solution requires the following necessary and suﬃcient condition: Q1D = ΦQ2D,w h i c hi fs a t i s ﬁed
means that expectational errors that work as loading factors are neutralized, yielding the following solution:


















Note that Equation (58) is nothing more than an SVAR, which allow us to calculate IRFs as well as variance
decompositions for shocks v, conditional on a standard calibration.34 The next section describes chosen parameters.
Then, we analyze IRFs when shocks placed in rows 1, 2 and 4 in Equation (53) hit the economy.
6.1 Calibration
The simulation exercise is conditional on the calibration assumed. In particular, we take as usual in the literature
a quarter as the unit of time in which decisions are made. Beginning with the share of rule-of-thumb consumers,
we assume that  = ∗ =0 6 a value that seems reasonable in light of the evidence suggested by Mankiw (2000)
(we also tried  = ∗ =0 1 and  = ∗ =0 8). Regarding parameters that aﬀect the utility function, Equation
(18), we calibrate the inverse of the Frisch elasticity, ,t o3. The literature suggests values for the Frisch elasticity
of around 0.20 for the U.S. (Rotemberg & Woodford (1998), Galí et al. (2007b)) and higher values, around 0.3
for the Euro Area (EA) (Forni et al. (2007) suggest 0.33). Moreover, the risk aversion parameter  is assumed
equal to 1.5 as is standard in the literature. The habit persistence parameter, , is assumed equal to 0.5, though
Smets & Wouters (2007) suggest higher values (0.7). Furthermore, the elasticity of money demand, ,e q u a l s23,
while the willingness to postpone consumption or the so-called discount factor,  is set to 0.99 in accordance with
an annual nominal interest rate of 4 percent. Technology is assumed to display decreasing returns to scale with
 set equal to 0.98. As price and wage stickiness depend o nt h er e s p e c t i v eC a l v op a r a m e t e r s ,w ea s s u m et h a t
on average all wages and prices are reviewed once a year, so we equally calibrate Calvo probability’s parameters
 =  =  =0 75. Regarding the elasticity of substitution of home and foreign goods, , it equalizes 18,
while we assume no home bias in the consumption bundle,  =0 5.T h ep e r s i s t e n c yc o e ﬃcients of AR(1) processes,





), are calibrated as  ≡ diag(0, 095, 095, 0, 0, 0, 0,
085, 085, 0, 0). This means that it is introduced persistency only in technology and public expenditure processes,
whereas the remaining ones are purely temporary shocks. These assumptions are dictated by common sense.
Monetary policy rules are assumed to be based on the Taylor principle. Therefore, the reaction parameter to
inﬂation, 1, is set equal to 1.5, with no inertia, i.e., 0 =0(Canzoneri et al. (2005) estimated a value of 0.22 for
the U.S.) and a reaction parameter to output gap, 2 set equal to 0125. The smoothing parameter, 3,i sa s s u m e d
0.75, consistent with a monetary policy that has full eﬀect after four quarters.
Fiscal rule parameters are set as follows, 1 =0 1 and 2 =0 05. Regarding taxes, we calibrate the wage tax
rates for the EA and U.S. following Coenen & Straub (2005)’s proposal: 
 =0 45 and 
 =0 15.S u c h t a x
rates will have sizable eﬀects on disposal income of non-Ricardian agents.
Consistent with EA data, steady-state parameters 
 = 
 that enter in the log-linearized form of Equation
(29) are set to equal to 1
077.
6.2 Numerical simulations
Why the IRFs are so important for policymaking? Because they reveal to policymakers the propagation mechanism
working after the occurrence of a shock: we can assess variables’ responses signs and convergence patters towards
their steady-state values. Likewise, variance decompositions deliver the relative size of ﬂuctuations in (observed
and unobserved) variables’ variability. Playing with draws of structural shocks in the parameterized model, policy
makers can ﬁgure out how policy interventions aﬀect key variables and even calculate their conﬁdence intervals.
In following subsections we will replicate results consistent with positive multipliers of consumption for expan-
sionary FP illustrated reported in Table 1. We explored a wide range of values for  that yields determinate
solutions, but simply we display three representative cases.










0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16











0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
λ=0.6, εy λ=0.1, εy λ=0.8, εy












0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6








0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16










0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
λ=0.6, εy λ=0.1, εy λ=0.8, εy









0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
λ=0.6, εy λ=0.1, εy λ=0.8, εy
Figure 1: Productivity improvement shock (Taylor rule with smoothing)
6.2.1 IRF of a productivity shock
The simulation of an unexpected shock in productivity of one standard deviation (SD) will raise consumption of
fully rational consumers, while decreasing consumption of rule-of-thumb consumers, see Figure 1. Given that the
latter goes down more deeply, it leads to a negative response of aggregated consumption. In opposition, foreign
aggregated consumption is boosted because of the spillover eﬀects. This result corresponds with the unambiguous
rise of foreign unconstrained consumption. There is a rise of consumption of foreign rule-of-thumb consumers,
however it does not maintain for all consumer type shares. The positive spillover eﬀect in the foreign country takes
place because of the rise in the real wage that is full when measured w.r.t. imported goods prices (substantially
cheaper). Notice that this expenditure switching eﬀect is so strong in both economies because all goods are fully
tradable, while the labor force is locked in the corresponding country. For an analysis of the adjustment process in
the presence of non-tradable goods, see Plasmans et al. (2007).
6.2.2 IRF of a monetary policy shock
In Figure 2 we report a negative, unexpected and purely temporary shock in MP and its eﬀects on consumption.35
T h ei m m e d i a t ee ﬀect occurs in the money market as both the nominal and the real interest rate go down since at
period zero the CB does not react. Of course, the CB reacts in subsequent periods following the rule (52).
As a result, aggregated consumption goes temporarily up, and also it is the case for home constrained consumers.
For unconstrained consumers it becomes more attractive to consumers postpone saving and to consume more at
the present. However, the eﬀect that prevails in unconstrained consumers’ behavior depends on how large is the
share of rule-of-thumb consumers in the economy. For example, a positive consumption response is veriﬁed for
 =0 6 but after two periods, consumption goes down because they expect the full reaction of the CB increasing
the interest rate to neutralize the shock (recall that 3 =0 75, so that a monetary policy has full eﬀect after four
quarters).
Given the tradability of the goods, foreign ﬁnancially unconstrained consumers foresee a temporary opportunity
to consume more because of the expansionary eﬀect of the foreign output resulting from higher exports to the
home country. This expansion in foreign consumption is quite weak and is full if all consumers were unconstrained.
Foreign rule-of-thumb agents consume less on impact because of the drop in the disposable income due to higher
foreign taxes to back the issuance of bonds that is employed to make sustainable the trade deﬁcit (i.e., to balance
the net foreign asset position).
6.2.3 IRF of a public expenditure shock
In our opinion, the most interesting case to analyze concerns expansionary FP in the home country which is
illustrated by IRFs of Figure 3 under a monetary regime where rule (52) applies. Conditional on the calibration we
proposed, in Figure 3 we observe that a positive impact on consumption occurs as a result of expansionary policy.
This result last a few quarters (approximately two quarters or more for   06) becoming negative afterward.
This behavior is the result of the relatively large weight of rule-of-thumb consumers in the economy that overturn
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Figure 3: Government spending shock in the home country (Taylor rule with smoothing)
the negative adjustment of consumption (according the REP) in response of future liabilities of the government.
Such an example shows under which conditions it is likely that the argument of Mankiw (2000) could have empirical
relevance. For a parameterization where   045, the response of home aggregate consumption remains negative
within four years. On the other hand, large values of  lead to model indeterminacy (Blanchard & Kahn (1980)
conditions do not hold). Therefore, the critical question that arises is which estimate of  is supported by the data
of the U.S. and of the EA.
7E s t i m a t i o n
In this section, we describe the data considered for the construction of observable variables. Besides, in next
subsection, we estimate the deep parameters of the model using Bayesian techniques.36
7.1 Data
We estimate our model for the EU-12 and for the U.S. economies. According to very recent ﬁgures, it is quite
reasonable to consider these economies as symmetric in terms of GDP and openness.
36All computations are performed with DYNARE set of routines, Juillard (2005b).
19Euro area data are proxied by relevant EU-12 aggregates (Eurostat), available on a quarterly basis. To obtain a
dataset with homogeneous frequency we interpolated military expenses series (SIPRI database) with Chow & Lin
(1971)’s method. All series are corrected from seasonality, deﬂated by the corresponding CPI index and translated
into per capita terms dividing by total population in the working age (16 to 65 years old) from OECD statistical
compendium. Finally, all series are taken in terms of deviations from their respective trends, as obtained by applying
the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter  equal to 1600. Our sample runs from 1991Q1 to 2006Q4.
Variables used for estimation are per capita private consumption, per capita government expenditure and per
capita GDP. Per capita government expenditure net of military expenditure gave similar estimation results. Table
A.1 in the Data appendix provides details on variables’ construction. The same variables are calculated with U.S.
data. Further details are summarized in Table A.2 in the Data appendix.
7.2 Data into the DSGE model and the likelihood function
Given the solution of the model from Equation (58) a direct estimation approach would maximize its likelihood
function with respect to  and (Σ); however, we must acknowledge that not all variables included into ˆ y are
observed. To include data, a partition of the vector ˆ y into observed and unobserved variables is needed, so that
ˆ y ≡ (ˆ y
ˆ y
 )0. In our model, ˆ y0
 is 6 × 1 Then, a state-space representation is derived from (58) which includes
a measurement equation:
ˆ y = Ξ0ˆ y−1 + Ξ1v
ˆ y
 = Υˆ y +  (59)
where Υ is a 6 ×  binary matrix that selects the observed variables from ˆ y,  is a measurement error that is
assumed to be  with mean zero vector and variance Σ. More explicitly, our speciﬁc measurement equation is:
⎛
































































where the ﬁrst entry of ˆ y
 in (60) correspond to the LHS of the GDP identity, or domestic resource constraint,
Equation (46); while the second an third entries link observed (aggregate) home tradable consumption and observed
government expenditures to RHS of (46). Symmetrically, 6th to 9th entries of ˆ y
 correspond the variables included
in the foreign resource constraint (47).
Denoting the sample as ˆ  




}, the density of ˆ  
 conditional on the parameters (likelihood)
can be written as:








 |  
−1(Σ)(Σ)) (61)
which includes a marginal density (involving the distribution of the initial condition) (ˆ y
0 | (Σ)(Σ))
and a conditional density. Given our linearized model (59) and our deﬁnition of , it follows that ˆ y
0 ∼ N(∞ [ˆ y
] ∞ [ˆ y
]).37
Concerning the second factor, the conditional density involves the evaluation of ˆ y
 |  
−1 which is not directly ob-
servable since ˆ y














37Construction of the likelihood for an AR(1) and AR(p) processes are derived in Hamilton (1994) Ch.5, Sections 2 and 3, respectively.
In case ˆ 
0 contains variables with unit roots, the initialization assumes an inﬁnite ∞ [ˆ y
], which is known as diﬀuse Kalman ﬁlter
20where the density of ˆ y
 |  
−1 depends on the mean of the density of ˆ y
|ˆ y where the relevant weight is the density
of ˆ y| 
−1. The former density is directly given by the measurement Equation (59), while ˆ y| 
−1 is computed by
the Kalman ﬁlter.
7.3 Bayesian estimation: the likelihood meets prior densities
Bayesian estimation and evaluation techniques have been particularly successful in estimation of not only small
DSGE models but also medium to large-scale New Keynesian models. The estimation procedure combines a likeli-
hood function (61) derived from our model with the speciﬁcation of a prior distribution for  ≡ ((Σ)(Σ))0.
As a result, the state-space representation can be translated to form the posterior distribution.
The idea behind the Bayesian principle is to look for a parameter vector which maximizes the posterior density,
given the prior and the likelihood based on the data. Formally, the posterior density (|ˆ y) is related to the prior




∝ (ˆ y|)()=(|ˆ y)()) (62)
where () is the prior density of the parameter vector, L(|ˆ y) is the likelihood of the data and (ˆ y)= R
Θ (ˆ y|)() is the unconditional data density, which, since it does not depend on the parameter vector
to be estimated, can be treated as a proportionality factor and accordingly can be disregarded in the estimation
process. Assuming  priors, the logarithm of the posterior is given by the sum of the log likelihood of the data
and the sum of the logarithms of the prior distributions:




The latter term can be directly calculated from the speciﬁed prior distributions of the estimated parameters.
For the computation of the log likelihood of the data the Kalman ﬁlter is applied to the DSGE model solution (the
state-state representation) for the number of periods, , provided by the data ˆ y.
The (multivariate) posterior distribution for our DSGE model would not exist in closed form; however, it can be
approximated through a Gaussian density providing the sample size grows.38 Following Tierney & Kadane (1986),
the posterior is understood as a kernel of unknown form, K() ≡ K( 
), given that (one of) its mode is assumed
to be known, ∗, taking logs and approximating the kernel using a 2 order Taylor expansion, yields:
logK() ≈ logK(∗) −
1
2
( − ∗)0 [(∗)]
−1 ( − ∗)
where (∗) is minus the inverse of the Hessian of the model evaluated at the posterior mode. Consequently, the
Gaussian posterior would be:






( − ∗)0 [(∗)]
−1 ( − ∗)
¾

which enables us to approximate posterior moments, as derived by Kass et al. (1989) and Tierney et al. (1989).
The whole point is that the asymptotic approximation ( →∞ ) makes sense if and only if the true posterior does
not diﬀer from the hypothesized Gaussian. More exact results for our sample range can be derived via simulation
given its non-standard shape, employing an approximation method around the optimum that generates a (large)
sample of draws using the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. This is useful to characterize the shape
of the posterior distribution, from which inference can be drawn. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is implemented
using a jumping distribution to visit areas that are not at the tails of the posterior. The validity of the "jump" is
assessed via acceptance-rejection instrumented with the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, where proposal draws that
are accepted (rejected) are included (excluded) in Markov chain. The researcher establishes the ratio of acceptance.
The simulation is considered large enough when pooled moments converge to within moments of the chain, see
Brooks (1998).
38A st h es a m p l ee n l a r g e s ,t h ec h o i c eo ft h ep r i o rd e n s i t yw o u l dn o ta ﬀect the posterior.
217.4 Estimation results
This section provides Bayesian estimates of deep parameters of our two-country model that are supported by data.
Leith & von Thadden (2006) studied local determinacy conditions to eﬀectively solve a model with interaction of
ﬁscal and monetary policies. Therefore, it could be potentially interesting to estimate these parameters for the U.S.
and for the EA.
The estimation strategy employed starts with reduced dimensions of the parameter space (the beginning is the
extreme case where all but one parameter is calibrated) and, subsequently, it is expanded. In subsequent trials,
where the dimension parameter space was enlarged, we found that some parameters were poorly identiﬁed. Finally,
we keep those parameters that are identiﬁed (by exploring the neighborhood of the mode) thus the information
contained in the data is correctly mapped to parameters. Of course, the researcher aims at obtaining estimates of
the parameter vector with the largest dimension, and this can be done adding more data series or a longer data
span (which can only be added if the number of shocks is higher, otherwise we could not solve it due to stochastic
singularity). Notice though, that in Section 5.3 we speciﬁed exogenous shocks, which we judged adequate. Adding
more shocks could be an interesting extension, though this is potentially troublesome if they are not motivated by
economic theory (shocks should help to identify data series), see the warnings posed by Chari et al. (2009) in this
respect.
Bearing these considerations in mind, we report in Table 2 Bayesian estimates arising from the maximization of
the posterior distribution of our DSGE model. Relevant information we speciﬁed includes:
1. prior means, SDs and density types;
2. prior lower and upper bounds (if prior distributions are truncated); and
3. posterior means and SDs and 90 percent conﬁdence interval for the posterior mean.
Table 2 reports Bayesian estimates for our two-country model.
T h e r ea r et h r e ed e n s i t yt y p e sc h o s e nf o rt h ep r i o r s :( i )b eta densities for parameters bounded within the (0,1)
interval; (ii) inverted Gamma densities for those parameters whose expected values are strictly positive (and possibly
unbounded from above) such as standard errors; and (iii) normal densities. Furthermore, prior means and SDs were
set considering economic theory as well as estimates from related previous studies.
Next we describe estimates of posterior means and brieﬂy we interpret them. Beginning with estimates of the
Frisch elasticity, 1, estimates are 0.27 and 0.38 for the EA and the U.S., respectively. Moreover, estimates of the
risk aversion parameters are 2.62 for the EA and 5.31 for the U.S., the latter seems to be larger than what the
literature report. Estimates of internal habit formation indicate quite similar degrees of persistency; while for the
EA it is 0.85 the one for the U.S. is 0.88, indicating that internal habit in consumption is quite persistent.
Technology processes are very persistent with estimates of  and ∗
 close to one, we observe values of 0.998
and 0.997 for the EA and the U.S., respectively. Estimates of persistency in government expenditure are 0.67 and
0.79 for the EA and the U.S., respectively.
Nominal rigidities are modeled as Calvo contracts where probabilities of updating prices and wages may reveal
the average duration of contracts. We observe that price contract durations last on average 1.5 and 1.33 quarters
for the EA and the U.S., respectively. As for wages, we observe values of 1.28 and 1.3 quarters, respectively. These
estimates indicate more price ﬂexibility than Bils & Klenow (2004).
Further, FP estimates 1 and ∗
1 are 0.13 and 0.07, respectively. Moreover, estimates 2 and ∗
2 are nearly
the same. Regarding estimates of the MP rule, reaction to inﬂation parameters are 1.47 and 1.54, while those to
output gap are 0.79 and 0.14, for the EA and the U.S., respectively. The measure of smoothing implicit in the MP
rules, suggest that the policy is fully in eﬀect after 4.56 and 5.67 quarters for the EA and the U.S., respectively.
Elasticities of substitution of home a foreign bundles as well as home bias in consumption parameters are poorly
identiﬁed, so we do not estimate them.
22Table 2 Bayesian estimation of deep parameters
Log data density: 2049.53.
Post mean 90% interval
Parameters Density Prior mean Prior SD Post mean lower upper
 3 0.5 3.7391 2.9984 4.4587
∗  3 0.5 2.622 1.8414 3.3766
 2 0.5 2.9029 2.2068 3.5825
∗  2 0.5 5.3166 4.7523 5.9106
 0.5 0.2 0.8501 0.7767 0.9309
∗  0.5 0.2 0.878 0.783 0.977
  0.5 0.15 0.3329 0.223 0.4447
∗
  0.5 0.15 0.2488 0.1504 0.3369
  0.5 0.15 0.2185 0.1314 0.3083
∗
  0.5 0.15 0.2309 0.1796 0.2827
  0.75 0.1 0.9981 0.9969 0.9994
∗
  0.75 0.1 0.9976 0.9958 0.9995
  0.75 0.1 0.6682 0.5421 0.8062
∗
  0.75 0.1 0.7931 0.6654 0.9308
1  0.25 0.15 0.1337 0.0101 0.2544
∗
1  0.25 0.15 0.0687 0.01 0.134
2  0.05 0.02 0.0487 0.0193 0.0784
∗
2  0.05 0.02 0.0494 0.019 0.0793
1  1.5 0.125 1.4678 1.2574 1.6568
2  0.125 0.05 0.0786 -0.0007 0.1599
3  0.75 0.1 0.7806 0.7305 0.8297
∗
1  1.5 0.125 1.5424 1.3522 1.7334
∗
2  0.125 0.05 0.1431 0.0695 0.221
∗
3  0.75 0.1 0.8235 0.7743 0.8736
Standard errors
Parameters Density Prior mean d.f. Post mean lower upper
 inv Γ 0.01 2 0.0535 0.045 0.0623
 inv Γ 0.01 2 0.0053 0.0043 0.0063
∗
 inv Γ 0.01 2 0.0027 0.0022 0.0033
 inv Γ 0.01 2 0.0046 0.0039 0.0054
∗
 inv Γ 0.01 2 0.0015 0.0012 0.0017
 inv Γ 0.01 2 0.0085 0.0023 0.0153
∗
 inv Γ 0.01 2 0.0089 0.0024 0.0167
 inv Γ 0.005 1 0.0158 0.0135 0.0181
∗
 inv Γ 0.005 1 0.0318 0.0269 0.0363
 inv Γ 0.01 2 0.011 0.0069 0.015
∗
 inv Γ 0.01 2 0.039 0.0326 0.045
8C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper investigates ﬁscal and monetary policies and how they can interact in order to better stabilize large
economies. As stabilization power of policies is potential and depends on the speciﬁc model setup, we examine
a fully microfounded model focusing attention on the short-run interaction of two large open economies, where a
fraction of the consumers are ﬁnancially constrained (and therefore acting in a non-Ricardian way). We argued that
the separation of consumers’ types has important consequences in open economies which have not been suﬃciently
analyzed in the literature.
Firstly, we estimated a small VAR model speciﬁcation with minimum structure and capture in a parsimonious
way, interesting results for the EU-12 aggregate. The ﬁscal multipliers obtained are positive and comparable in size
to those found by Galí et al. (2007b) for the U.S., the only qualitative diﬀerence if we plot the sequence of ﬁscal
multipliers the graph would have shown a hump-shaped form, whereas Galí et al. (2007b) ﬁndings suggest that
ﬁscal multipliers decrease along time monotonically. Results are at odds with the suggested prediction from RBC
models based on the permanent income hypothesis.
23Taking into account these consumption developments, we accomplished a classical numerical simulation analysis
with our model, where parameters calibrated resemble the EU-12 and the U.S. economies and we ask under which
conditions we are able to generate developments of consumption as those predicted by the VAR. We ﬁnd that
we need more than 50 percent of rule-of-thumb consumers in both economies to reproduce the IRFs of VAR, a
similar ﬁgure was proposed by Mankiw (2000). Diﬀerent shares of non-Ricardian consumers were considered and
its implications for stability analyzed, conﬁrming that if the share of rule-of-thumb consumers increase to such
an extent that become dominant, the model’s solution becomes indeterminate, an issue also shown by Galí et al.
(2007b).
The analysis of IRFs allows us to conclude that the monetary policy design may have little inﬂuence in the channel
of transmission that matters for consumption ﬂuctuations and by them to comsumption multipliers. Critically, active
FP will shape aggregate consumption ﬂuctuations through the transfer’s channel together with disposable income
ﬂuctuations, regardless the shock we considered.
We estimated a subset of deep parameters conditional on a the rule-of-thumb share that is 0.6 to obtain similar
IRFs as from the estimated VAR employing Bayesian techniques. These estimates seem to be in accordance with
the literature.
For future research agenda, we acknowledge that the current model needs to be extended to take into account
the stock of physical capital to generalize our conclusions. Moreover, diﬀerent taxation regimes should be analyzed
focusing more on how the disposable income is generated and varies with changes in transfers or in tax proceedings.
Meanwhile, the presented model assumed that these channels were shut down.
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28AD a t a A p p e n d i x
Table A.1
Variables for EU 12 (BE, DE, IE, GR, ES, FR, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI)
Description Source and series’ name
Government expenditure divided by lagged GDP trend Eurostat: "na-p3_s13"
Government expenditure net of military expenses divided by lagged GDP trend Eurostat: "na-p3_s13"; SIPRI database
Government revenues divided by lagged GDP trend Eurostat: "gov_q_ggnfa", SA adj
Government deﬁ cit divided by lagged GDP trend Constructed
GDP over working age population, in logs Eurostat, "na-b1gm", OECD: "POPT"
Private consumption over working age population, in logs Eurostat: "na-p3"; OECD: "POPT"
Note: Countries abbreviations are Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France,
Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, respectively.
Table A.2
Variables for U.S.
Description Source and series’ name
Government expenditure divided by lagged GDP trend FRED II: “GCEC1”
Government expenditure net of military expenses divided by lagged GDP trend FRED II: “GCEC1”; SIPRI database
Government revenues divided by lagged GDP trend Constructed
Government deﬁ cit divided by lagged GDP trend FRED II: “TGDEF”
GDP over population older than 16 years old, in logs FRED II: "GDP", "CNP16OV"
Private consumption over working age population, in logs FRED II: “PCECC96”, "CNP16OV"
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− 1= = ∗ (64)











where  ≡ 
 and  ≡ 





















where  ≡ 
 and  = 
 . Given the fact that there is no transportation cost,  = E.I n
real terms,  = ,w h e r e ≡ E ∗
 and  ≡ 
 ∗ .

















where  ≡ 













Since  = 
E = −1































The real wage could be unambiguously determined equalizing  from (65) with the real version of Equation







































































where  is an scale parameter that measures technology at the steady state, if  =1  then  equals 
 .
We assume that 

 = 
 =  and  =  =  in the remaining to obtain real steady state
aggregates. First, notice that the consumption of constrained households, Equation (29), can be written as:
 =( 1− ) +  (70)
where transfers are determined by the binding steady state real GBC:








∗ = + 
where  ≡ 
 ,  ≡ 
 ,  ≡ 
 and  ≡ 
 (recall that  =1 ). In addition,  ()s t a n d sf o r
the home bonds that are invested in home (foreign) portfolios. Notice that the gross total stock of debt denominated
in home currency is  ≡  + . Similarly, ∗ ≡ 
∗
 ∗ which can be expanded into foreign and home holdings of
foreign denominated bonds: ∗ = ∗+ ∗. To convert into home real terms we multiply by  ≡ E ∗
 .
To determine the amount of tax levied on domestic producers and importers dividends,  ( + ),w e
ought to expand  = 1
 ( + ) and  = 1
 ( + ).39 To do so, note that domestic and import
demands evaluated at the steady state are:
 = [()]


































 and  comes






































where we replaced  by  +( 1− ).
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+(1 − ) +  +
(1−)(+)
  − ∗
(1+∗)
∗
  − 
 
⎫
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and with the steady state value of the nominal
interest rate from (64) that 
(1+) = ∗











































where  − ∗ is the real net foreign assets position (domestic real in the sense that is measured w.r.t. a
home composite good). Therefore what appears into braces is the total real debt position in terms of GDP. These
steady state ratios along with
(1−)
 and 








































we can write  = Φ1, which partially explains the steady state aggregate consumption level in Equation (30);
thus:
 ≡ Φ1 +( 1− )
It remains to solve for  to get ﬁnally . To do so, we write the CBC at the steady state as:
(1 − )(1− )
 +( 1− ) +( 1− )( + )+
=( 1− ) +( 1− )
£
 + − ∗¤

Substituting from (73) into the latter expression yields:

























⎦ +( 1− )
+(1− )(1− )
£
 + − ∗¤
− (1 − ) =( 1− ) +( 1− )
£
 + − ∗¤








































































































. Thus, it can be written in a short form as
 = Φ2,w h e r eΦ2 is deﬁned as follows:
Φ2 ≡ z2
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




























  − 

⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭

Therefore, the steady state version of (30) is:
 ≡ [Φ1 +( 1− )Φ2]






Λ ,w h e r e





























Since the consumption of unconstrained consumers depends on , replacing  = Φ2 into expression above








































































 ( + )+
⎡


























































under symmetry, i.e. assuming:  = ∗
,  = , previous expression simpliﬁes to:
 =[ ()]
 ( + )+[ ()]
 (1 − )∗
and from Equation (28), evaluated at the steady state ( = ΛΛ∗ = 
−−+
(∗)−−+) the relationship between




since Equation (30) also holds in the foreign country, it follows that:
 =[ ()]
 ( + )+[ ()]
 (1 − )
£







 +  +( 1− )
£








33following Galí (2008), from the risk sharing condition we ﬁnd that  = ∗
1
−−+, and at the steady state
can be restated as  = ∗()
1
−−+,w h e r e = 
 = 
() ≡ ().N o t et h a t∗ = Φ∗
1,w h i c hl e a d st o
(∗ ):
 =[ ()]

























































































































(1 − ) (76)
To determine the steady home (foreign) state terms of trade, we need to solve Equations (75), (76), (74) and its
foreign counterpart. Unknowns are  (∗ = 1
 ),  (= ),  and .
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